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“You Have to Understand”: The Saga of Longfin 
Corp. Reveals the Danger of Trading Halts 
Imposed by Self-Regulating Exchanges 
  
THOMAS DAVIS†† 
Late 2017 marked, perhaps, the peak of Bitcoin frenzy. A number of specious, if not outright 
fraudulent issuers took advantage of this craze by publicly listing their stock while touting some 
connection to blockchain technology. One of these issuers, Longfin Corp., exploded to a $6 billion 
market cap despite being little more than an empty shell promoted by alleged fraudsters. Short 
sellers who investigated Longfin were seemingly correct about the company being worthless, but 
a lengthy trading halt instituted by Nasdaq caused many of these short sellers to suffer 
considerable losses instead of cashing out on what would otherwise be hugely profitable short 
positions. This Note proposes changes to the regulatory scheme that currently allows self-
regulating exchanges like Nasdaq to issue such trading halts with almost no restrictions. The 
recommended changes would further the principles of free and open markets and transparency 
that are fundamental to the securities laws by preventing exchanges from arbitrarily halting trade 
for extended periods of time.  
 
 †  Recent graduate of the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, Class of 2020; Articles 
Editor, Hastings Law Journal. Thank you to Professors Jared Ellias and John Crawford for their feedback and 
edits throughout the writing process. Further thanks to the many amateur traders, named and unnamed, whose 
experiences form the basis of this Note. 
 † The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclaims responsibility for any private publication 
or statement of any SEC employee or commissioner. This Note expresses the Author’s views and does not 
necessarily reflect those of the commission, the commissioners, or other members of the staff. Lastly, this Note 
was originally scheduled for publication in the fall of 2020 but was unavoidably delayed due to world events. In 
the interim, Longfin was the subject of a flurry of legal developments; in particular, government enforcement 
actions. These developments do not impact the argument presented in this Note and have been omitted to avoid 
the inconvenience of resubmitting the Note to the SEC for review and approval. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Whether diligent or not, regulators can and do fail in preventing frauds and 
scams from listing on public exchanges. This creates a ripe hunting ground for 
short sellers (colloquially, investors or traders who bet against an asset),1 who 
have a substantial monetary incentive to root out and expose these frauds—
picking up the investigatory slack where regulators come up short. Shorting a 
company can take various forms, all of them fraught with risks. Some of these 
risks are baked-in, unavoidable consequences of the financial instruments used 
to short. Others stem from sensible protective measures put in place by 
regulators to maintain market stability. These risks are generally well-
established and accepted by those who choose to enter the world of short selling. 
This Note explores another type of risk; one that exists only because of the 
heavy-handed use of trading halts by self-regulating stock exchanges. The story 
of Longfin Corp. clearly demonstrates the nature of this risk and why the 
regulatory justifications for its existence do not hold up to scrutiny. 
After debuting at $5 per share on the Nasdaq in December 2017, the stock 
price of Longfin Corp. (NASDAQ: LFIN) fluctuated wildly during the handful 
of months it was listed on the exchange, enjoying a multibillion-dollar market 
cap for most of that time.2 The purported FinTech and cryptocurrency company 
attracted considerable scrutiny from short sellers for several reasons, not least of 
which being two interviews given live on CNBC by the company’s embattled 
CEO Venkat Meenavalli.3 In those few months, the suspicions of the short 
sellers were seemingly validated, and regulators alleged that Longfin’s IPO was 
replete with fraud from the very start.4 Throughout this saga, Longfin was 
heavily shorted, much to the chagrin of Meenavalli, who pointed much of his ire 
in their direction.5 Notably, many of these short sellers were retail traders who 
congregated in online discussion forums to investigate Longfin and trade on 
their shared information.6 
The alleged improprieties of Meenavalli and his co-conspirators are not, 
however, the focus of this Note. Stripping behind the more absurd aspects of 
Longfin’s story leaves little more than an alleged run-of-the-mill stock 
promotion scheme, albeit one that was quite successful for a short period of time. 
Rather, this Note concerns actions undertaken by Nasdaq and other large 
 
 1. For an extensive explanation of the mechanics of short selling, see discussion infra Part II.F. For an 
explanation of the role short sellers play in the market, see discussion infra Part III.A. 
 2. See Lily Katz & Brad Oleson, Longfin’s Wild Crypto Ride Goes Beyond Any Short Seller Attack, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 6, 2018, 9:50 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-06/don-t-blame-
longfin-s-short-sellers-for-crypto-stock-s-wild-ride; Complaint at 7, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Longfin Corp., 
316 F. Supp. 3d 743 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 18-CV-2977). 
 3. See Katz & Oleson, supra note 2.  
 4. Kate Rooney, SEC Takes Aim at Controversial Crypto Company Longfin, Freezes $27 Million in 
Proceeds from Insider Stock Sales, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/06/sec-freezes-27-million-from-
stock-sales-involving-ceo-of-crypto-company-longfin-and-three-others.html (June 11, 2018). 
 5. Evelyn Cheng, CEO of Controversial Crypto Company Longfin Blames Short Sellers for Stock Plunge, 
CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/04/controversial-crypto-stock-longfin-surges-then-halted-after-its-
announced-ceo-to-appear-on-cnbcs-fast-money.html (Apr. 5, 2018). 
 6. See discussion infra Part II.E. 
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institutions that manifested considerable, unjustified losses by short sellers who 
were “too right” about Longfin’s fraudulent nature. Following repeated failures 
to recognize and address the various frauds and deficiencies related to the 
company, Nasdaq issued a regulatory trading halt on the stock on April 6, 2018, 
which stayed in place until Longfin voluntarily delisted to the over-the-counter 
(OTC) market and resumed trading on May 25, 2018.7 During this halt, two 
rounds of heavily traded put options expired worthless.8 Were it not for the halt, 
these put options would all but certainly have been deep in the money, and would 
have been highly profitable for their holders. Instead, the put holders were 
locked into their positions with no realistic way out, resulting in a total loss for 
most. 
This Note uses the story of Longfin to argue that retail traders and the 
market overall would be better served by stricter limitations on the use of certain 
types of trading halts by Nasdaq and similarly situated self-regulating 
organizations (SROs). In Part I, the Note will explain in brief the SRO system, 
the reasons for its existence, and pertinent details surrounding the use of trading 
halts by SROs, particularly the legal ramifications (or lack thereof) that follow 
a halt. In Part II, the Note will place the reader in the shoes of traders who 
watched the company’s rise and fall by recounting the factual background of 
Longfin, progressing chronologically from the company’s IPO to its condition 
as of this writing, while focusing on the circumstances surrounding the 
protracted T12 trading halt that preceded Longfin delisting from the Nasdaq and 
the harm thus caused. Additionally, this Part will explore certain contextual 
aspects of Longfin’s story that reinforce the justification for change, and explain 
some of the jargon and trading technicalities that must be understood in order to 
recognize the problem highlighted by this Note. Following this factual 
background, Part III will provide a condensed analysis of potential liabilities for 
involved parties, which will show that the harmed investors have no realistic 
prospect of recovery through litigation. Finally, Part IV will explain why the 
problem highlighted by Longfin is better solved ex ante through changes in 
regulation rather than through extension of liability and will propose and 
examine various solutions to the problem. These proposed changes will center 
around limiting or eliminating SRO power to issue certain types of trading halts 
and will also weigh the benefits of requiring greater transparency in the use of 
such halts. 
 
 7. See discussion infra Part II.J. 
 8. See discussion infra Part II.K. 
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I.  SROS WIELD CONSIDERABLE REGULATORY POWER 
A.  THE SRO SYSTEM 
Though SROs in the financial context have existed in concept for hundreds 
of years,9 modern day SROs are rooted in statute; of principal concern here, the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.10 SROs, which institute and enforce their own 
rules, are foundational to the modern securities regulation scheme, described by 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as “a basic premise of the 
Exchange Act.”11 The Exchange Act issues a directive to SROs that is similar in 
substance to that given to the SEC itself, dictating that an SRO’s rules must be  
designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to promote 
just and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and coordination 
with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing information 
with respect to, and facilitating transactions in securities, to remove 
impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a 
national market system, and, in general, to protect investors and the public 
interest.12  
While SROs are not entirely independent—their rulemaking processes being 
subject to oversight by federal agencies13—they retain “significant autonomy to 
determine the fundamental elements of their operating policies and governance 
structure.”14 This oversight relationship is often described as deferential, with 
the SEC rarely disapproving SRO rulemaking proposals.15 
Putting aside analysis of this regime’s effectiveness, the primary reasons 
for its inception as a codified legal reality were its political and economic 
expediency.16 Maintaining a system of self-regulation was simply the path of 
 
 9. Mark D. West, Private Ordering at the World’s First Futures Exchange, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2574, 2580 
(2000) (describing the emergence of SROs to regulate primitive rice futures exchanges in seventeenth-century 
Japan). 
 10. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (defining a self-regulatory organization as “any national securities exchange, 
registered securities association, or registered clearing agency”). 
 11. Commission Guidance and Amendment to the Rules Relating to Organization and Program 
Management Concerning Proposed Rule Changes Filed by Self-Regulatory Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg. 40,144, 
40,144 (July 11, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200, 241).  
 12. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (emphasis added), with 15 U.S.C. § 78b (listing as one of the purposes 
of the Exchange Act “to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets”).  
 13. Kristin N. Johnson, Governing Financial Markets: Regulating Conflicts, 88 WASH. L. REV. 185, 202 
(2013) (discussing statutes authorizing administrative oversight of SRO rulemaking). 
 14. Id. at 201. 
 15. Emily Hammond, Double Deference in Administrative Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1705, 1736 (2016) 
(suggesting an “understanding” that agencies defer to SROs in SRO rulemaking); Saule T. Omarova, Rethinking 
the Future of Self-Regulation in the Financial Industry, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 665, 695 (2010) (“[I]n practice, 
the agency has fully delegated these regulatory functions to privately funded SROs, choosing instead to function 
as the watchful guard and supervisor ensuring that the SROs perform their statutory duties in an appropriate 
manner.”). 
 16. As of today, self-regulators in the financial industry were a “force[] to be reckoned with” in the 1934 
political arena. Marianne K. Smythe, Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry and the 
Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for an Accommodation, 62 N.C. L. REV. 475, 481 (1984). “From the 
outset . . . Congress assumed that its task included incorporating the existing self-regulatory institutions (i.e., the 
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least resistance in 1934. Since then, the financial sector has only increased in 
political influence and complexity, bolstering the motivations for legislative 
recognition of SROs. As such, whatever statutory changes may come as to the 
oversight and autonomy of SROs, abrogation of the system in its entirety in the 
foreseeable future is eminently unlikely. 
Proponents of the SRO system tend to point to the government’s relative 
inability to regulate the erstwhile self-regulated financial industry,17 suggesting 
that the subject-matter knowledge and relative agility of industry insiders makes 
them better suited to exercise regulatory authority.18 Other purported benefits 
include the speed with which SROs can respond to changes in the market as 
compared to government agencies.19 More abstractly, advocates sometimes 
point to a sense of ownership and representation fostered by the SRO system 
within those they regulate.20 It follows that this sense of inclusion might lead to 
productive, collaborative interactions with government regulators, as opposed to 
wasteful, adversarial interactions and non-compliance by private actors.  
Opponents of SROs are likely to point to that very “sense of ownership” as 
a glaring deficiency of the system. The so-called “revolving door” of 
employment at the SEC, wherein SEC employees and appointees leave the 
Commission to advocate on behalf of the companies they formerly regulated 
(and invariably, for far greater compensation), is one of the most vigorously 
debated and oft-cited examples of regulatory capture.21 The threat of regulatory 
 
stock exchanges) into the new regulatory system.” Id. Despite frequent criticism, the SRO system endures 
“because lawmakers have generally regarded self-regulation to be a practical and efficient way to outsource the 
burdens of regulation to the private sector.” Onnig H. Dombalagian, Self and Self-Regulation: Resolving the 
SRO Identity Crisis, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 317, 323 (2007). 
 17. Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory Technique, 47 
ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 181 (1995). 
 18. Id. 
  Lawyers, economists, and political scientists have created a diverse literature on government 
regulation. Overall, they have identified five distinct advantages of audited self-regulation over 
other regulatory techniques. First, rules can be more effective because of the self-regulator’s 
superior knowledge of the subject compared to the government agency. Second, self-regulation 
allows for more diversity in methods of compliance with legal rules than is possible for a 
government agency to provide. Third, self-regulation may result in better compliance with rules, 
no matter who promulgates them or how they are designed, because self-enforcement is more 
effective and more easily accepted by the regulated entities. Fourth, self-regulation can result in 
cost savings to the government, and these savings may be greater than the costs imposed on private 
groups, thus resulting in less costly regulation overall. Finally, self-regulation is consistent with 
modern regulatory reform characterized by the retreat from bureaucratic “command and control” 
methods of regulation. 
Id. 
 19. Omarova, supra note 15, at 674. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Ben Protess & Susanne Craig, S.E.C.’s Revolving Door Hurts Its Effectiveness, Report Says, N.Y. 
TIMES: DEALBOOK (Feb. 11, 2013, 12:01 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/11/s-e-c-s-revolving-
door-hurts-its-effectiveness-report-says; Dominic Rushe, Mary Schapiro: The Latest Official Through the 
Regulatory Revolving Door, GUARDIAN (Apr. 2, 2013, 12:38 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/ 
2013/apr/02/mary-schapiro-sec-revolving-door; Francine McKenna, Speed of Revolving Door Between SEC and 
Private Sector Is Shocking, Says Expert on Regulatory Capture, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 7, 2018, 10:33 AM), 
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capture is, of course, that regulators will act in the best interests of their 
prospective future employers rather than the market whose integrity they are 
supposed to protect. For those wary of regulatory capture, the SRO is the very 
culmination of those fears. Rather than private actors simply exerting undue 
influence over regulators, in an SRO system, the private actors themselves are 
tasked with a substantial portion of their own regulation. Though SROs are 
supposed to act in the best interests of the market as a whole,22 the possibilities 
for conflicts of interest in such a system are obvious,23 and although the SEC 
and SROs have acted to address these concerns,24 the possibility for such 
conflicts are an inherent part of any SRO system. Other criticisms of the system 
include “widespread collective action problems, lack of effective enforcement 
capabilities, inability of self-regulatory organizations to gain or maintain 
legitimacy, and, ultimately, the failure of accountability.”25 Further, though the 
SEC reviews SRO rulemaking before passage, there is no formal process for 
critical evaluation of existing rules.26 Another major point of contention is the 
extension of absolute immunity to SROs acting in their regulatory capacity, 
which will be discussed in detail below. 
B.  QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY OF SROS 
Once a luxury afforded only to judges, the doctrine of absolute sovereign 
immunity—an absolute bar on actions against government entities for damages 
stemming from their activities—has been iteratively expanded to cover a wide 
range of governmental activities, and even to SROs in the discharge of their 
regulatory duties.27 Despite frequent criticism centering around the lack of 




 22. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (2018).  
 23. Critics of self-regulation tend to view it as “self-serving, self-interested, lacking in sanctions, beset 
with free rider problems, and simply a sham.” Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of 
Regulation and Self-Regulation in a ‘Post-Regulatory’ World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103, 115 (2001). 
 24. Dombalagian, supra note 16, at 333 (describing SRO’s efforts to bifurcate their business and regulatory 
operations to reduce conflicts of interest). Many of the regulatory functions once performed by the exchanges 
have been carved out to the non-profit FINRA, presumably resolving many conflict of interest issues; however, 
of relevance here, regulation of each exchange’s individual market remains the responsibility of that exchange. 
Andrew J. Cavo, Note, Weissman v. National Association of Securities Dealers: A Dangerously Narrow 
Interpretation of Absolute Immunity for Self-Regulatory Organizations, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 415, 424 (2009). 
 25. Omarova, supra note 15, at 675. 
 26. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-12-625, Securities Regulation: Opportunities Exist to Improve 
SEC’s Oversight of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 25 (2012), https://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/600/591222.pdf. 
 27. For a detailed examination of the development of absolute immunity jurisprudence as it pertains to 
SROs, see Rohit A. Nafday, Comment, From Sense to Nonsense and Back Again: SRO Immunity, Doctrinal 
Bait-and-Switch, and a Call for Coherence, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 847 (2010). 
 28. E.g., Jennifer M. Pacella, If the Shoe of the SEC Doesn’t Fit: Self-Regulatory Organizations and 
Absolute Immunity, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 201, 222 (2012). 
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Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc.,29 the already-expansive protection 
that this doctrine affords SROs has only expanded further in recent years.30 
SROs are afforded absolute immunity when performing their “quasi-
governmental” duties; while this vague term is subject to continual debate, it has 
been further explained to mean activities that “‘relate[] to the proper functioning 
of the regulatory system’” such that the SRO “‘stands in the shoes of the 
SEC.’”31 
Though the exact borders of the doctrine remain unclear, there are certain 
categories that fall squarely within it: 
(1) disciplinary proceedings against exchange members; (2) the enforcement 
of security rules and regulations and general regulatory oversight over 
exchange members; (3) the interpretation of the securities laws and 
regulations as applied to the exchange or its members; (4) the referral of 
exchange members to the SEC and other government agencies for civil 
enforcement or criminal prosecution under the securities laws; and (5) the 
public announcement of regulatory decisions.32 
Occasionally, courts have applied absolute immunity to specific actions. 
Of particular relevance here is Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. 
Dealers, Inc., wherein the court stated that “there are few functions more 
quintessentially regulatory than suspension of trading.”33 
C.  THE T12 HALT 
Trading halts, put simply, suspend all trading on a stock and its options 
until the halt is lifted, and are put in place for a variety of reasons, ranging from 
deficiencies in regulatory filings to dramatic price swings.34  
As an initial matter, no one has meaningfully questioned Nasdaq’s legal 
authority to emplace the halt at issue in this Note, nor has anyone attempted to 
sue Nasdaq for the damages incurred as a result. Any such suit would be doomed 
from the outset. In addition to the general authority to make and enforce rules 
granted to SROs by the Exchange Act,35 the SEC promulgated a rule specifically 
 
 29. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 500 F.3d 1293, 1294 (11th Cir. 2007). Though 
Weissman introduced an apparent jurisdictional split and is of great relevance to the debate surrounding absolute 
immunity for SROs, the nature of the actions at issue in Weissman are so different in character to those 
undertaken by Nasdaq here that the holding is beyond the scope of this Note and does not merit deeper 
discussion. 
 30. E.g., In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 101 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating explicitly that there 
is no fraud exception to SRO absolute immunity, even in the “most unusual circumstances,” and that SRO 
inaction is also protected by absolute immunity). 
 31. Id. at 96 (quoting D’Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 105 (2d Cir. 2001)).  
 32. Id. (citations omitted). 
 33. Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1214 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding 
that NASD was immune to a suit brought because of a trading halt), abrogated by Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562 (2016). 
 34. Press Release, FINRA Issues New Investor Alert: When Trading Stops: What You Need to Know 
About Halts, Suspensions and Other Interruptions (Sept. 27, 2012), https://www.finra.org/media-center/news-
releases/2012/finra-issues-new-investor-alert-when-trading-stops-what-you-need-know.  
 35. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
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granting exchanges the power to halt trading “in accordance with [the 
exchange’s] rules.”36 The rule does not place a time limit on halts, suggesting 
that they can continue indefinitely unless “it shall appear to the Commission that 
such suspension is designed to evade the provisions of section 12(d) and the 
rules and regulations thereunder relating to the withdrawal and striking of a 
security from listing and registration.”37 Thus, as long as an SRO invokes one of 
its own rules to issue a halt, that halt is proper.  
Nasdaq’s rules include a multitude of scenarios in which it either may or 
shall issue a halt on various types of securities.38 In general, the rules authorize 
Nasdaq to initiate halts when it “deems it necessary to protect investors and the 
public interest,” pursuant to a list of scenarios described by the rules.39 Per 
Nasdaq, a T12 code indicates that trading on the security is “halted pending 
receipt of additional information requested by NASDAQ.”40 Though the Nasdaq 
rules lack any explanation of which halt code aligns with the rule it invokes, T12 
appears to correspond with Rule 4120(a)(5), which states that the exchange  
may halt trading in a security listed on Nasdaq when Nasdaq requests from 
the issuer information relating to: (A) material news; (B) the issuer’s ability 
to meet Nasdaq listing qualification requirements . . . ; or (C) any other 
information which is necessary to protect investors and the public interest.41  
Whereas some of the halt justifications and the procedures and 
consequences they implicate are laid out with great specificity,42 Rule 
4120(b)(5) is quite vague, and lacks clarifying language beyond the general 
proviso of Rule 4120(a). As such, the rules provide very little for outsiders to go 
on when trying to interpret a T12 halt. All one can deduce from seeing the T12 
code is that Nasdaq is seeking additional information from the issuer. Given the 
catchall of Rule 4120(b)(5)(C), that information could be almost anything. Rule 
4120(c) contains further detail on the procedures involved in initiating any of 
the listed halts, but there is little there to explain under what circumstances a 
T12 halt will be lifted—only a requirement that Nasdaq disseminate notice when 
a halt is issued.43 
 
 36. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12d2-1(a) (2019).  
 37. In other words, the halt can continue indefinitely unless the SEC determines that the exchange is 
purposefully dragging its heels to prevent a stock from delisting. See id § 240.12d21(b). 
 38. NASDAQ, NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULEBOOK § 4120 (2020), https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/ 
rulebook/nasdaq/rules/nasdaq-4000. 
 39. Id. § 4120(a). 
 40. Trading Halts, NASDAQ TRADER, https://www.nasdaqtrader.com/Trader.aspx?id=tradehaltcodes (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
 41. NASDAQ, supra note 38, § 4120(a)(5).  
 42. See id. § 4120(a)(12). Several of these halts are limit-up/limit-down halts, commonly referred to as 
“circuit breakers”—halts that trigger automatically when a security’s price moves a certain amount over a short 
period of time in order to combat excess volatility and stabilize the market. In contrast to the T12 halt at issue 
here, which is issued at the discretion of Nasdaq, circuit breakers begin and end according to set indicators and 
time limits and are not discretionary. For more detail on circuit breakers, see Jason Fernando, Circuit Breaker, 
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/circuitbreaker.asp (Jan 28, 2021). 
 43. See NASDAQ, supra note 38, § 4120(c). 
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II.  THE SAGA OF LONGFIN CORP. 
A.  SETTING THE STAGE: THE CRYPTO CRAZE OF 2017 
On December 7, 2017, the price of Bitcoin, which began the year at around 
$900,44 broke $19,000 for the first time.45 The cryptocurrency craze that 
dominated the year’s headlines and enticed many novice investors (or 
speculators, depending on who you ask) was at its absolute peak. There was 
certainly no shortage of doubters—foremost among them being Warren Buffett, 
who described the cryptocurrency in 2014 as a “mirage” with little intrinsic 
value.46 The skeptics were widely ignored; drowned out, perhaps, by the scores 
of newly-minted cryptocurrency millionaires roaring down Main Street in their 
Lamborghinis.47 
Whatever the merits of cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology writ 
large may be, the lack of regulation, the difficulty faced by a layperson in 
understanding the underlying technology, and the incredible hype generated by 
Bitcoin’s success makes the area ripe for scams, frauds, and simple irrational 
exuberance—often resulting in spectacular implosions.48 As the end of 2017 
approached and Bitcoin continued hitting new all-time-highs, this trend 
announced its arrival on Wall Street. In October, Bioptix, Inc., formerly a 
manufacturer of medical diagnostic equipment, announced a pivot to Bitcoin 
mining and a name change to “Riot Blockchain,” sending the company’s stock 
price surging some 600%.49 In December, drinks manufacturer Long Island Iced 
Tea Corp. followed suit, announcing a similar pivot and a name change to “Long 
Blockchain Corp.,” resulting in a more than 400% increase in stock price.50 
Since then, both companies have seen a precipitous decline in value 
 
 44. Stan Higgins, From $900 to $20,000: Bitcoin’s Historic 2017 Price Run Revisited, COINDESK (DEC. 
30, 2017, 8:20 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/900-20000-bitcoins-historic-2017-price-run-revisited. 
 45. Evelyn Cheng & Fred Imbert, Bitcoin Tops Record $19,000, Then Plunges in Wild 2-Day Ride, CNBC 
(Dec. 7, 2017, 8:01 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/06/bitcoin-tops-13000-surging-1000-in-less-than-24-
hours.html. 
 46. Tae Kim, Bitcoin Up Sevenfold Since Warren Buffett Warned Digital Currency Was a ‘Mirage’, CNBC 
(Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/07/bitcoin-up-sevenfold-since-warren-buffett-warned-digital-
currency-was-a-mirage.html. 
 47.The trend of early crypto speculators buying Lamborghinis and other flashy purchases with their newfound 
wealth was so prevalent that it became a meme, with some variation of “when lambo” becoming a recurring 
comment in online crypto discussions. Gareth Jenkinson, Lambos, Bling and Mansions—What Purchases Do 
Crypto Millionaires Make, COINTELEGRAPH (Sept. 21, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/lambos-bling-
and-mansions-what-purchases-do-crypto-millionaire-make. 
 48. Jean Eaglesham & Dave Michaels, Crypto Craze Drew Them in; Fraud, in Many Cases, Emptied Their 
Pockets, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 26, 2018, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/crypto-craze-drew-them-in-
fraud-in-many-cases-emptied-their-pockets-11545820200. 
 49. Tamara Chuang, CEO of Colorado Biotech-Turned-Blockchain Company Explains Why He Sold Stock 
After Price Quadrupled, DENVER POST, https://www.denverpost.com/2018/02/11/riot-blockchain-bioptix-
castle-rock/ (May 21, 2018); see also Lily Katz, A Biotech Company Changed Its Name to ‘Riot Blockchain’ 
and Its Stock Is Surging, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4, 2017, 1:22 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-
10-04/from-biotech-to-bitcoin-bioptix-shifts-focus-to-blockchain. 
 50. Arjun Reddy, The Iced-Tea Company That Pivoted to Blockchain Is Finally Going All in on 
Blockchain, BUSINESS INSIDER: MARKETS INSIDER (Mar. 7, 2019, 3:06 PM), https://markets.business 
insider.com/currencies/news/long-blockchain-crypto-pivot-is-complete-2019-3-1028012464. 
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commensurate with their sudden rise, SEC investigations, and a bevy of civil 
suits against the companies or their officers from regulators and investors alike.51 
Longfin Corp. soon followed—while attracting considerably more attention. 52 
B.  THE LONGFIN IPO 
 
Longfin debuted on the Nasdaq exchange on December 13, 2017.53 Making 
use of the relaxed reporting and registration requirements afforded to microcap 
public offerings under Regulation A+ of the Jumpstart Our Business Startup 
(JOBS) Act,54 the company described itself as “a leading global FinTech 
company powered by Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning.”55 The 
company’s offering circular describes Chairman and CEO Venkat Meenavalli 
as a “global techno entrepreneur,” a “financial wizard,” and perhaps most 
 
 51. Riot Blockchain remains under SEC investigation, and its former CEO departed after being implicated 
by the SEC in an unrelated pump and dump scheme. Jennifer Schlesinger, Scott Zamost, Hannah Kliot & Ritika 
Shah, Riot Blockchain SEC Investigation Is ‘Still Ongoing’, CNBC (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2018/11/21/riot-blockchain-sec-investigation-is-still-ongoing.html. Long Blockchain also remains under SEC 
investigation and was delisted by Nasdaq after falling below the $35 million market cap listing requirement. 
Tom McKay, ‘Long Blockchain’ Maybe Not as Smart as It Thought, GIZMODO (Aug. 1, 2018, 8:45 PM), 
https://gizmodo.com/long-blockchain-maybe-not-as-smart-as-it-thought-1828042681. 
 52. See Crypto Reg A+ to Delists from Nasdaq, PUBCOCEO (May 7, 2018), https://pubcoceo.com/2018/ 
05/07/crypto-reg-a-to-delists-from-nasdaq/ (providing photograph of Longfin IPO). 
 53. Press Release, Longfin Corp., Longfin Corp. Celebrated Its IPO on Nasdaq (Dec. 13, 2017), 
https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2017/12/13/1261643/0/en/Longfin-Corp-Celebrated-its-IPO-
on-Nasdaq.html. 
 54. Longfin has since become a poster child for critics of Reg A+ offerings, who point to the company as 
evidence that this provision of the JOBS Act opened the doors to fraud. See, e.g., Jean Eaglesham & Aaron Back, 
Longfin Collapse Puts Focus on Lax IPO Rules, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 3, 2018, 4:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/longfin-collapse-puts-focus-on-lax-ipo-rules-1522788520. 
 55. See Press Release, supra note 53. 
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dubiously, an “eloquent speaker.”56 Longfin drew little attention in its first two 
days of trading, reaching an intraday high of $6.94 and closing at $5.17 from a 
starting price of $5 on its first day.57 Total volume across the first two days of 
trading was less than 500,000.58 
Though it would only come to light months later, Longfin’s listing appears 
to have been fraudulent from the start.59 In an opinion granting a SEC motion to 
extend an asset freeze on the proceeds of stock sales by Meenavalli and his 
alleged co-conspirators, the court found it likely that a significant number of 
Longfin’s IPO shares were, rather than sold to the public, gifted to company 
insiders in an apparent effort to meet Nasdaq’s minimum publicly held share 
requirement for listing.60 Apparently, Longfin fabricated these and other similar 
transactions, and along with a slew of other lies, omissions, and obfuscations 
aimed at meeting the minimum requirements, fraudulently obtained a listing on 
Nasdaq’s exchange.61 
C.  THE ZIDDU “ACQUISITION” 
Longfin’s obscurity was short-lived. Before market open on Friday, 
December 15th, two days after the company’s quiet debut on the Nasdaq 
exchange, Longfin unveiled its master stroke: the acquisition of Ziddu.com, a 
“[b]lockchain-empowered solutions provider that offers Microfinance Lending 
against Collateralized Warehouse Receipts in the form of Ziddu Coins.”62 
Whatever that string of words may mean, one word within it—blockchain—had 
an immediate and profound effect on the company’s stock price.63 That day, 
trade volume on shares of Longfin topped 15,000,000—approximately 50x the 
volume seen on the first day of trading—and the company closed at $22.01, 
already a major uptick from the previous day’s close of $5.39.64 With the story 
of Longfin’s rapid ascent having percolated over the weekend, and in 
combination with the stock’s low liquidity due to extremely limited public 
 
 56. Longfin Corp., Offering Statement (Form 1-A) (Mar. 10, 2017), https://sec.report/Document/ 
0001699683-17-000001/. 
 57. LFIN Historical Data, NASDAQ,  https://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/lfin/historical (last visited Feb. 4, 
2021). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See SEC v. Longfin Corp., 316 F. Supp. 3d 743, 769 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 60. Id. 
 61. For examples of Longfin’s multifarious deceptions, see Grant Beaty, 9 Reasons Why Nasdaq Should 
Delist LongFin Immediately, SEEKING ALPHA (Apr. 17, 2018, 2:20 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/ 
4163537-9-reasons-nasdaq-delist-longfin-immediately. 
 62. Press Release, Longfin Corp., Longfin Corp. Acquires Ziddu.com, a Blockchain-Empowered Global 
Micro-Lending Solutions Provider (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2017/ 
12/15/1262779/0/en/Longfin-Corp-Acquires-Ziddu-com-A-Blockchain-empowered-Global-Micro-lending-
Solutions-Provider.html. 
 63. Matt Levine, Maybe Crypto Will Make Securities Fraud Obsolete, BLOOMBERG: OPINION (Dec. 19, 
2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-12-20/maybe-crypto-will-make-
securities-fraud-obsolete. 
 64. LFIN Historical Data, supra note 57.  
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float,65 the stock price catapulted further upwards on Monday, December 18th, 
reaching an intraday high of $142.82 and closing at $72.38.66 Using the 
December 18th closing price, Longfin’s market cap was approximately $6.2 
billion—a more than 1200% increase in value from the company’s listing only 
five days prior.67 
Curiously, Longfin stated in the 8-K announcing the Ziddu acquisition that 
the deal actually took place on December 11th,68 raising questions as to why the 
disclosure was filed several days after the company had already publicly listed.69 
Even more curious was the entity selling Ziddu to Longfin in exchange for 2.5 
million shares of the company: Meridian Enterprises Pte. Ltd., a private 
company based out of Singapore that happened to be 95% owned by none other 
than Venkat Meenavalli.70 Many were skeptical of the notion that Meenavalli 
effectively selling to himself an asset the SEC later described as having “no 
ascertainable value”71 justified a 1200% increase in stock price;72 and so, in a 
move that was bold if nothing else, Venkat Meenavalli scheduled an in-studio 
appearance during after-hours trading on December 18th on CNBC’s Fast 
Money program to put forth a valiant defense of his company’s legitimacy.73 
D.  THE FIRST CNBC INTERVIEW 
Meenavalli’s first live television appearance began during after-hours 
trading on the afternoon of December 18th. From the outset of the broadcast, 
CNBC made clear that Meenavalli would be put on the defensive—emblazoned 
at the bottom of the screen was the tagline “Crypto stock or crypto scam?”74 As 
the hosts grilled him on the eyebrow-raising circumstances of the Ziddu 
acquisition and the lack of clarity in regard to what Longfin actually does, 
Meenavalli grew increasingly flustered, responding with a mix of half-answers 
and non-answers.75 When asked how many Bitcoin transactions Longfin has 
 
 65. Public float refers to the number of shares held by the public, and thus available to trade. Mary Hall, 
What Exactly Is a Company’s Float?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/what-is-
companys-float/ (May 19, 2019). Longfin’s liquidity was deceptively low in part because of the fraudulent share 
issuance to company insiders disguised as IPO sales; nearly half of the supposedly publicly held shares were in 
fact restricted shares owned by insiders and affiliates, which shares they illegally tried to sell after public listing. 
SEC v. Longfin Corp., 316 F. Supp. 3d 743, 752–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 66. LFIN Historical Data, supra note 57. 
 67. Levine, supra note 63. 
 68. Longfin Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/1699683/000169968317000040/8kacquisition.htm.  
 69. Beaty, supra note 61. 
 70. Longfin Corp., supra note 68.  
 71. Complaint at 3, SEC v. Longfin Corp., 316 F. Supp. 3d 743 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 18-CV-2977). 
 72. Nicole Bullock & Robin Wigglesworth, Blockchain Fervour Evokes Memories of Dotcom Bubble, FIN. 
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/40ec964a-e429-11e7-8b99-0191e45377ec. 
 73. Evelyn Cheng, CEO of Cryptocurrency Play Up 1,000% in 2 Days to $3.1 Million: ‘This Market Cap 
Is Not Justified’, CNBC (Dec. 19, 2017, 10:29 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/18/ceo-of-surging-
cryptocurrency-stock-this-market-cap-is-not-justified.html. 
 74. Fast Money (CNBC television broadcast Dec. 18, 2017). 
 75. See id. 
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engaged in, Meenavalli responded, “I own 140 Bitcoins.” 76  He repeatedly 
stated, “I am a profitable company,” mentioned his “team of quants,” and 
contended that companies like Longfin are “the Geicos of the world.”77 He 
frequently mentioned “disintimidation,” possibly a mispronunciation of 
“disintermediation.”78 He repeatedly told the Fast Money hosts, no less than 
eleven times, some variation of this Note’s titular line: “you have to 
understand.”79 When pressed by the hosts, Meenavalli acknowledged the 
absurdity of his company’s market cap, disclaiming it as “not justified” and the 
result of “euphoric mania.”80 Between market close and the start of the CNBC 
interview, Longfin’s stock price stabilized around $77. As the interview 
progressed, Longfin’s price dropped some 16% in after-hours trading, with 
CNBC helpfully displaying this sharp downward trend in a chart next to 
Meenavalli’s face.  
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. 
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E.  VENKAT BREAKS THE INTERNET 
Whatever its intended effect, Meenavalli’s interview turned him into a 
minor celebrity in certain circles of the internet; most notably, the Reddit 
subforum /r/Wallstreetbets, which boasts about 1.6 million subscribers as of this 
publication and serves as one of the internet’s most popular gathering places for 
retail traders.81 Though Longfin garnered relatively little attention on the forum 
 
 81. Wallstreetbets, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/wallstreetbets/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). Though 
ostensibly a place for retail traders to gather and share their research, participation in Wallstreetbets centers more 
around highly risky and minimally-informed trades, often using complex derivative strategies that the users don’t 
fully understand, glorification of trading losses (so-called “loss porn”), and the use of crass and offensive humor. 
See Roisin Kiberd, You Probably Shouldn’t Bet Your Savings on Reddit’s ‘Wallstreetbets’, MOTHERBOARD 
(Dec. 11, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/nedzqm/you-probably-shouldnt-bet-
your-savings-on-reddits-wallstreetbets; Jake Davidson, Meet the Bros Behind /r/WallStreetBets, Who Lose 
Hundreds of Thousands of Dollars in a Day—And Brag About It, MONEY (Oct. 25, 2018), http://money.com/ 
money/5405922/wall-street-bets/. Most recently, the forum made headlines when one user mistakenly thought 
he had discovered a foolproof arbitrage strategy called a box spread, often used with European style options, 
calling it “risk free money.” Shawn Langlois, Trader Says He Has ‘No Money at Risk,’ Then Promptly Loses 
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prior to the CNBC interview,82 Meenavalli’s live television performance 
generated significant interest. In a post titled “LFIN CEO talks nonsense for 
eleven minutes on CNBC,” user Shauncore provides a narrative of the interview, 
describing Meenavalli’s first few minutes of speech as a “Michelin star quality 
word salad” and generating over 1000 upvotes and hundreds of comments from 
entertained and curious users.83 This interest resulted in “you have to 
understand” becoming a meme within the forum,84 and a significant number of 
retail traders looking for short plays on Longfin.85 Longfin garnered attention 
from retail traders on a number of other social media platforms in addition to 
Wallstreetbets—other investing-related subforums on Reddit,86 stock market 
focused Twitter facsimile StockTwits,87 and the crowdsourced financial analysis 
site Seeking Alpha.88 Collectively, users on these sites actively researched and 
discussed the company and related trading strategies. As will be discussed later 
in this Note, these retail traders appear to have frequently beat financial 
institutions and regulators to the punch in peeling back the layers of Longfin’s 
allegedly fraudulent onion. It was these retail traders who would go on to be 
deprived of much of the benefit of their work due to the regulatory flaw this Note 
seeks to highlight. 
F.  SHORTING LONGFIN 
Prior to January 30, 2018, prospective Longfin shorts had only one 
mechanism by which they could bet against the stock: traditional short selling, 
or borrowing shares (usually from one’s broker) to sell now, with the promise to 
return the same number of shares later, with hopes that those returned shares will 
 
Almost 2,000%, MARKETWATCH (Jan. 22, 2019, 2:43 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/trader-says-he-
has-no-money-at-risk-then-promptly-loses-almost-2000-2019-01-22. In reality, the user failed to recognize the 
risk of early assignment inherent to American style options, resulting in a 2000% loss when his brokerage 
stepped in and closed the trade. Id. The user, posting under the name 1R0NYMAN, became one of the forum’s 
most popular and pervasive memes, held out as the best example of the forum’s philosophy to date. Id. 
 82. The first post relating to Longfin generated only twenty-five upvotes and forty-five comments, with 
most commenters expressing extreme skepticism towards the company. TickerTanker, Anyone Playing LFIN?, 
REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/wallstreetbets/comments/7kl8hu/anyone_playing_lfin/ (last visited Feb. 4, 
2021).  
 83. Shauncore, LFIN CEO Talks Nonsense for Eleven Minutes on CNBC, REDDIT (Dec. 20, 2017), 
https://www.reddit.com/r/wallstreetbets/comments/7kxpwc/lfin_ceo_talks_nonsense_for_eleven_minutes_on_
cnbc/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). “Upvotes” are given out by Reddit users to signify interest in a post. See Matt 
Silverman, Reddit: A Beginner’s Guide, MASHABLE (June 6, 2012), https://mashable.com/2012/06/06/reddit-
for-beginners/.  
 84. See, e.g., hepcecob, Can Someone Explain the “You Have to Understand” Meme?, REDDIT, 
https://www.reddit.com/r/wallstreetbets/comments/8axbd9/can_someone_explain_the_you_have_to_understan
d/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
 85. See, e.g., moritzplatz, Give Me Some LFIN to Short, Please :(((, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/ 
r/wallstreetbets/comments/7lbaot/give_me_some_lfin_to_short_please/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
 86. See, e.g., ishkabum, Why Is Short Selling Not Allowed on Longfin?, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/ 
r/investing/comments/7lcita/why_is_short_selling_not_allowed_on_longfin/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
 87. See Longfin Corp., STOCKTWITS, https://stocktwits.com/symbol/LFIN (Feb. 4, 2021). 
 88. See LFIN—Longfin Corp., SEEKING ALPHA, https://seekingalpha.com/symbol/LFIN (Feb. 4, 2021). 
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be purchased at a substantially lower price with the short seller pocketing the 
difference.89 
While potentially lucrative, short selling can be unattractive for a number 
of reasons. First, because there is no upper limit on share price, short selling can 
theoretically result in unlimited loss.90 Second, short selling requires the use of 
a margin account, which allows the accountholder to trade “on margin”; in other 
words, with money (or shares) borrowed from the broker, upon which the 
borrower must pay the broker interest.91 Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA) requires a minimum of $2000 in cash or equity value to open 
a margin account,92 making margin trading—and thus short selling—
inaccessible to those with very small accounts.  
Third, margin accounts require maintenance margin, a minimum amount 
of equity value relative to the amount borrowed from the broker.93 Falling below 
this level results in a margin call, wherein the broker demands that the 
accountholder deposit enough value into the account to bring it back within 
margin requirements. If the accountholder does not do so within a certain 
timeframe, the broker will close positions and liquidate the account’s assets until 
it is brought back within the requirements.94 This can be disastrous for the 
accountholder, as those positions are likely to be closed at inopportune times, 
possibly resulting in an otherwise avoidable loss or worse.  
Fourth, the need to fend off the aforementioned margin requirements 
combined with a desire on the part of short sellers to limit losses can create a 
phenomenon known as a “short squeeze”—if the shorted stock sharply increases 
in value, short sellers will buy back shares to cover their positions and limit their 
losses.95 This buy pressure, in turn, further increases the stock price, forcing even 
more short sellers out of their positions and creating a feedback loop that can 
result in huge losses for shorts caught unaware.96  
Finally, borrowing shares to short sell requires the seller to pay the lending 
broker a fee, calculated as a percentage of position value, for the privilege;97 
assuming, of course, that the broker can obtain the shares and is willing to lend 
them in the first place. The more difficult it is for the broker to find lendable 
 
 89. For a more detailed explanation of short selling, see James Chen, Short Selling, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shortselling.asp (Feb. 4, 2020). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. FINRA, RULES & GUIDANCE § 4210(b)(4) (2016), https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/ 
finra-rules/4210. 
 93. Purchasing on Margin, Risks Involved with Trading in a Margin Account, FINRA, 
http://www.finra.org/investors/purchasing-margin-risks-involved-trading-margin-account (last visited Feb. 4, 
2021). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Cory Mitchell, Short Squeeze, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/ 
shortsqueeze.asp (Apr. 19, 2020). 
 96. See id. 
 97. James Chen, Stock Loan Fee Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/stock-
loan-fee.asp (Apr. 14, 2019). 
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shares (that is, the more illiquid the market), the higher the fee.98 In the case of 
highly liquid securities, such as shares of a blue chip company such as Apple, 
these fees are fairly low. If the market is illiquid, however, the fees can be 
prohibitively high, and if the shares are classified as “hard to borrow,” the fees 
can be astronomical.99 In 2018, borrow fees for shares of Tesla were somewhat 
high as the company was heavily shorted relative to its size, averaging around 
2.5% annualized as of August that year.100 In comparison, borrow fees for 
Longfin exceeded 200% annualized on multiple occasions and rarely dipped 
below 100%, with an average borrow fee of 183% as of April 2018.101 With 
short interest consistently over one million shares during this time period, 
substantially all of the company’s public float was sold short.102 With such high 
fees, even steady declination in the stock price can easily be outpaced by the cost 
to borrow, making traditional short selling of companies like Longfin an 
unpalatable way to bet against them. 
For traders put off by the risks and barriers to entry of traditional short 
selling, the next best (often better, depending on the circumstances) alternative 
is to buy derivatives called put options.103 A put option, usually just called a 
“put,” is a contract that gives the buyer (who takes a “long put” position), in 
exchange for a premium paid to the seller, the right, but not the obligation to sell 
a certain number of underlying securities (usually shares of a company or fund 
in lots of 100) at a certain price (the “strike price”) to the put seller (or “writer”) 
within a specified time frame dictated by fixed expiry dates.104 If the strike price 
of the put is above the price of the underlying shares, then the put is “in the 
money” and has an intrinsic value of the strike price less the price of the 
underlying.105 If the strike price of the put is below the price of the underlying, 
the put has no intrinsic value.106  The premium paid above the intrinsic value of 
a put is called time value; in essence, the amount the buyer is willing to pay for 
the likelihood that the put will increase in value in the time left before it 
expires.107 Explained in the simplest possible terms, the value of a put goes up 
as the underlying stock price goes down. There is significantly more complexity 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. The Motley Fool, If You Aren’t Careful, This Brokerage Fee Could Wipe You Out, NASDAQ (June 11, 
2016, 8:24 AM), https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/if-you-arent-careful-brokerage-fee-could-wipe-you-out-
2016-06-11. 
 100. Elena Popina, So You Want to Short Tesla. Here’s What You Pay to Pull It Off, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 24, 
2018, 1:35 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-24/so-you-want-to-short-tesla-here-s-
what-you-pay-to-pull-it-off. 
 101. Katz & Oleson, supra note 2. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Though not relevant here, a “short call” position, entered by selling call options, is another mechanism 
by which a trader can effectively short a stock. See Troy Segal, Short Call, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/short-call.asp (Jan. 28, 2021).  
 104. Justin Kuepper, Put Option, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/putoption.asp (Jan. 
28, 2021). 
 105.  Id.   
 106.  Id.   
 107.  Id.   
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to options and options pricing than is explained here,108 but the takeaway most 
pertinent to this Note is that an options position is uniquely time sensitive in a 
way that a short sale is not. While a short position can theoretically be 
maintained as long as the holder is able to finance the associated fees, interest, 
and margin requirements, options have hard and fast expiration dates past which 
they are worthless. 
In exchange for this strict time sensitivity, a put buyer gains several 
advantages over a short seller. First, whereas short selling carries unlimited 
downside risk, buying an option risks only the premium paid for it—you cannot 
lose more money than you put in. Second, because the buyer is not borrowing 
anything from the broker, buying options does not require a margin account, 
meaning a lower barrier to entry and that the risks associated with margin 
lending can be avoided if the trader so desires.109 Third, options trade separately 
from the underlying security and thus will not necessarily be liquidity 
constrained by an illiquid underlying. Fourth, there are no borrow fees 
associated with buying options, so even if the options market is illiquid, ancillary 
costs (such as commissions paid to the broker) will not increase as a result. 
Taken together, these advantages make buying puts an attractive alternative to 
short selling, especially to retail traders who want to short an extremely illiquid 
stock like Longfin. 
On January 30, 2018, Longfin options opened for trading on the Nasdaq 
exchange.110 Though there is some indication that Nasdaq never should have let 
Longfin options trade in the first place due to insufficient public float on the 
underlying stock,111 trade they did, and thousands of options contracts changed 
hands in the handful of months they were listed on Nasdaq’s exchange.112 
G.  THE CALM BEFORE THE STORM 
Given the substantial skepticism that many market participants 
demonstrated towards the company, Longfin’s stock price showed remarkable 
resilience for much of the time it spent listed on Nasdaq’s exchange. Between 
the huge spike on December 18, 2017 and mid-March of the next year, Longfin 
did not once trade below $30, mostly hovering around $35,113 steadily 
maintaining its multibillion-dollar market cap. There was little by way of 
meaningful news during this period; if anything, most noteworthy was the 
 
 108. For further explanation on options pricing, see Pricing Options, NASDAQ (June 10, 2019, 11:10 AM), 
https://www.nasdaq.com/investing/options-guide/pricing-options.aspx. 
 109. Of course, traders can still buy puts on margin just as they would any other security—it just is not 
required. 
 110. Press Release, Longfin Corp., Longfin Corp. Options Begin Trading on Nasdaq (Jan. 30, 2018), 
https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2018/01/30/1314503/0/en/Longfin-Corp-Options-Begin-
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absence of news: Longfin failed to issue an earnings report of any variety until 
April 2nd, when it filed its first 10-K.114 On January 22th, Longfin entered into 
a $52.7 million financing agreement with Hudson Bay Capital Management.115 
The terms of this agreement, in which Longfin exchanged convertible notes and 
stock warrants for $5 million in cash (less $1.3 million in fees) and a promissory 
note set to mature in 2048, were highly unfavorable to Longfin and would 
significantly dilute the company’s public float upon completion.116 Besides the 
company announcing retention of a new accounting firm and noise about the 
rapid decline of Bitcoin,117 there was simply nothing to report about the black 
box that was Longfin during this period. 
H.  AS LONGFIN RALLIES, THE SHORTS PILE IN 
On March 16, 2018, trade volume on Longfin, which had rarely broken 
past 250,000 in the previous months, suddenly spiked to over 3 million.118 The 
high volume persisted over the next few days, and Longfin’s stock price shot 
upwards, closing at $71.10 on March 23th—almost double where it had begun 
the month.119 The impetus behind this sudden runup was not immediately clear, 
leaving some observers baffled.120 On March 22nd, Longfin announced that, 
effective March 16th, the company would be included in the FTSE Russell 3000 
and 2000 indices, which measure “the performance of the largest 3,000 U.S. 
companies” and “the small-cap segment of the U.S. equity market” 
respectively.121 These indices serve as benchmarks for providers of passive 
investment vehicles called exchange traded funds, which allow investors to buy 
a weighted basket of the companies listed in the benchmark index. Thus, on 
March 16th, institutional investors and asset managers who offer these products 
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such as Blackrock, Vanguard, and Schwab began buying shares of Longfin to 
balance their funds tracking the Russell indices.122 This buy pressure, combined 
with Longfin’s low public float, drove the huge uptick in share price—by March 
21st, these institutions “accumulated a position of 511,244 shares, or 45 per cent 
of the entire free float” of the company.123 
Many traders, still skeptical of Longfin, viewed this rally as the perfect 
opportunity to open a short position on the company.124 In a March 22nd post 
titled “Longfin DD: About to go skydiving without a parachute,” Reddit user 
Fughazi presents a detailed attack on Longfin’s finances and apparent lack of 
actual business operations, concluding with a recommendation to short the 
company via puts.125 A March 23rd post from user soundofreedom titled 
“LongFin (LFIN): The Biggest Scam of 2018” also recommends buying puts 
based on further attacks on the company’s financials, describing the Hudson Bay 
financing agreement as “usurious,” and observing that Longfin did not appear to 
meet the listing requirements for inclusion in the Russell indices.126 The same 
day, an independent analyst published an article on Seeking Alpha that further 
explores the questionable decision to index Longfin.127 Noting that FTSE 
Russell requires that a minimum of 5% of shares outstanding be publicly held 
for a company to be included on their indices,128 the analyst points out that 
Longfin reported 1,140,989 publicly held shares against 76,540,989 total shares 
outstanding, nowhere near the 5% public float required, and concludes that 
Longfin’s inclusion was most likely a mistake on the part of FTSE Russell.129 
Mainstream pundits followed close behind. On March 26th, outspoken activist 
short seller Andrew Left of Citron Research tweeted: “If you are fortunate 
enough to get a borrow,130 indeed $LFIN is a pure stock scheme. 
@sec_enforcement should not be far behind. Filings and press releases are 
riddled with inaccuracies and fraud.”131 Nasdaq itself hosted what appears to be 
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a third-party article on their website predicting a downslide.132 The article notes 
the difficulty in finding a borrow for a short sale, and recommends buying May-
expiry puts.133 Notably, none of these mainstream sources appear to have noticed 
the float deficiency observed by the retail traders and independent analysts; the 
Nasdaq-hosted article even misattributes Longfin’s price rally to a short squeeze, 
rather than the already-discovered explanation of the Russell inclusion.134 
Around this time, retail traders began buying puts on the company, anticipating 
an immense fall.135 
I.  LONGFIN EXITS THE RUSSELL, AND THE CRACKS WIDEN 
After market close on March 26th, only a handful of days after announcing 
the addition of Longfin to its indices, FTSE Russell announced that it would 
remove the company effective at start of trading on March 29th.136 The retail 
traders who called the inclusion into question seem to have been vindicated; 
Longfin’s public float was indeed insufficient, and FTSE Russell failed to 
notice.137 The institutional investors who bought Longfin shares to balance their 
Russell-tracking funds rushed to be the first to dump their positions before the 
price fell too far, racking up more than $10 million in losses in the span of a few 
days.138 BlackRock funds alone, which accumulated nearly half of Longfin’s 
public float, lost some $8 million.139 Longfin’s stock price dropped over 40% on 
the news.140 Meenvalli was quick to defend his company, claiming that 
expiration of the lockup period on a consultant’s shares would bring Longfin 
within the necessary parameters for inclusion in the Russell indices,141 and that 
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he planned on bringing legal action against Citron Research for their negative 
comments.142 By close of market on April 2nd, Longfin fell to $14.31 per 
share.143 
The bloodbath was not yet at its end. On April 2nd, Longfin filed a 10-K 
report for the first time in company history.144 In it, Longfin disclosed that on 
March 5th, the SEC contacted the company to inform it of an ongoing 
investigation into its IPO and acquisition of Ziddu, accompanied by document 
requests for information pertaining to same.145 Unsurprisingly, Longfin’s stock 
price continued to plummet, closing at $9.89 on April 3rd.146 To the bafflement 
of observers,147 Meenavalli arranged another live appearance on Fast Money for 
April 4th after market close.148 Though this second broadcast failed to produce 
the sort of quotables of the first, Meenavalli observers were equally unconvinced 
by his defense of the company.149 As the hosts attacked Longfin’s almost 
complete lack of business operations, the discrepancies in its financial reporting, 
and the suspicious circumstances of stock issuance to Meenvalli’s friends and 
family, including a significant number of shares distributed to his wife, who 
allegedly attempted to sell them on the open market, Meenavalli calmly 
responded without clearly answering any of the hosts’ questions.150 He went on 
to blame his company’s woes on short sellers, and threatened to report them to 
the SEC and FINRA.151 Over the next two days, Longfin’s stock price surged.152 
While perhaps bolstered by Meenavalli’s performance in the second interview, 
a more likely explanation for the rally is short sellers buying shares to cover their 
positions and take profits, triggering a quasi-short squeeze.153 Either way, 
Longfin closed on April 6th at $28.19—its last-ever trading price on Nasdaq’s 
exchange.154 
J.  THE HALT 
On April 6nd, Nasdaq halted all trading on Longfin effective 10:01 A.M. 
EDT,155 freezing in place the $28.19 share price. Shortly after, the SEC 
announced that it had obtained an emergency freeze on $27 million of proceeds 
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from illicit stock sales conducted by Longfin affiliates shortly after the IPO.156 
Put-holding retail traders were immediately concerned for their positions, 
leading to the creation of a Reddit sub-forum—/r/LongFinOptions—specifically 
dedicated to discussing the situation as it unfolded.157 Beyond the T12 code 
discussed previously,158 Nasdaq offered little information on their posture 
towards the company and what traders could expect in the coming days. 
Meanwhile, Longfin unleashed a storm of bad news that, were the company 
trading freely, would have exerted significant downward pressure on the stock 
price. On April 9th, Longfin announced receipt of a Nasdaq non-compliance 
letter received on April 6th stemming from the company’s failure to file a timely 
10-Q; the letter demanded that Longfin provide a suitable compliance plan by 
April 13th to maintain its listing on the exchange.159 That same day, Longfin 
announced that the company’s accounting firm CohnReznick resigned the day 
before the halt.160 On April 12th, the company defaulted on the Hudson Bay 
financing agreement, making due repayment of $33.6 million in cash or shares 
no later than April 20th.161 
Examining the discussion of retail traders around this period reveals mass 
confusion and a growing sense of anger and panic, with traders desperately 
hunting for ways out of their positions.162 On April 20th, 26,951 put options, 
4889 of which were already “in the money” were set to expire, constituting tens 
of millions of dollars in premium paid and magnitudes of order more in profit 
potential.163 Unable to sell their puts and close their positions, holders had one 
choice besides simply letting their puts expire: exercise the contractual right that 
constitutes the value of a put,164 which is unaffected by a trading halt, and sell 
shares at the strike price.165 To do so, however, the put holder must have shares 
to sell—an unlikely position to be in for a trader looking to short an obvious 
fraud.166 With shares made impossible to purchase by the halt, a trader in need 
of shares to sell via exercise had to borrow them—in other words, opening a 
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traditional short position at the strike price of the put.167 Assuming the trader 
was even able to obtain a borrow, which many were not,168 they were forced to 
adopt the innate risks of traditional short selling,169 as well as some additional 
risks that exist in short selling potentially fraudulent foreign-based companies 
like Longfin. First, since obtaining shares to cover the short position was 
impossible as long as the halt persisted, the trader would be on the hook for 
extravagant hard-to-borrow fees until the halt lifted, the date of which was an 
unknown variable at the time.170 Second, in the worst case scenario, Longfin 
would cease to exist, its shares would become nigh unobtainable, and the short 
position would become impossible to close; this nightmare scenario brought 
down hedge fund TFS Capital after it shorted a set of fraudulent Chinese 
companies.171 When the companies disappeared and their shares ceased trading 
on any exchange, TFS Capital became stuck in its short positions for months, 
even years, paying millions in fees to borrow shares that were long since 
worthless.172 For those unwilling to bear these harrowing risks, their only hope 
was that Nasdaq would lift the halt prior to expiration, or delist the company and 
send it to the pink sheets to resume trading there.173 
K.  APRIL 20 AND MAY 18 PUTS EXPIRE 
As of April 20, 2018, the halt was still in place; meanwhile, thousands of 
put options expired. Nasdaq remained silent on the issue, and as affected traders 
commiserated and raged,174 Nasdaq became the target of most of their ire.175 
They then turned their concerns to the next expiration date, May 18th. Besides 
minor developments in the SEC action against Longfin insiders,176 there was 
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little by way of news to assuage their fears that the May-expiry puts would suffer 
the same fate as those that died on April 20th. Then, on May 3rd, Longfin 
announced its intention to voluntarily delist from the Nasdaq exchange by filing 
a Form 25 on May 14th, which would become effective ten days later on May 
24th, whereupon the company would resume trading OTC.177 This was a mixed 
blessing for the affected traders. Those with open short positions learned that an 
end to their massive borrow fees, should they choose to cover, was nigh, and 
those holding puts with expiries later than May 24th knew that the Nasdaq halt 
no longer posed a threat to their position. Conversely, those holding puts set to 
expire on May 18th knew for certain that unless Nasdaq lifted the halt, their only 
way to capitalize on their positions remained the still-dangerous and expensive 
short sale through exercise. Nasdaq remained, as before, silent on the issue. 
Indeed, the halt remained until Longfin officially delisted from the Nasdaq 
exchange on May 24th, having lasted a total of forty-seven days. 
L.  THE END: LONGFIN DELISTS AND RESUMES TRADING OTC 
On May 24th, Longfin delisted and resumed trading OTC, opening at 
$5.05,178 allowing shorts to cover and put holders to freely exit their positions. 
Barring some minor upwards fluctuations, the stock price steadily declined, 
hovering between $0.50 and $1.50 in the several months prior to this writing.179 
There is little else to report about Longfin; on November 13th, the company 
quietly entered an Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors, a state law alternative 
to liquidation via chapter 7 bankruptcy.180  
III.  PROBLEMS AND LIABILITIES 
A.  THE PROBLEM 
By refusing to lift the halt, Nasdaq deprived a significant portion of 
Longfin shorts the benefit of their trades. Nasdaq failed in its duty as a regulator 
by allowing Longfin to list on its exchange in the first place despite its clear 
ineligibility, and failed again by allowing it to trade freely for months after its 
fraudulent nature was completely apparent; by listing options that, again, 
Longfin was never eligible to have; and, by trying to quietly shuffle the company 
off its books with a heavy-handed regulatory halt that harmed a huge number of 
retail traders that shorted the company. All the while, Nasdaq offered almost no 
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communication whatsoever as to these traders’ concerns; instead, its strategy 
appears to have been to ignore the problem until it went away. 
Perhaps, if there were a good reason for the halt to have stayed in place for 
so long, Nasdaq’s actions would be understandable, if not commendable. No 
such reason presents itself. In an official FAQ, Nasdaq claims that while it 
“recognizes that a trading halt can disadvantage existing investors, Nasdaq’s 
primary regulatory responsibility is to prospective investors.”181 While this 
policy may seem sound at first glance, it falls apart under scrutiny. First, there 
is no consistency in its application: Riot Blockchain, a company that came to 
public attention under circumstances similar to Longfin’s and was also under 
SEC investigation around the same time period, was never subject to a Nasdaq 
regulatory halt, and remains listed on the exchange as of this writing.182 Second, 
when actually applied, the policy results in absurd and undesirable outcomes—
as clearly demonstrated with Longfin. The notion that “prospective investors” 
needed protection from Longfin at the time of the halt beggars belief—the 
company’s many alleged failings were already widely documented and 
publicized. Any market participant choosing to invest in Longfin would have 
done so either with ample notice that they were gambling on an alleged fraud, 
or in complete, willful ignorance. In exchange for this “protection,” Nasdaq 
shifted the losses onto Longfin shorts who appeared to be entirely correct in their 
criticisms of the company. 
Further, Nasdaq’s interpretation of their regulatory duty is not well-
supported by the statute. The 1934 Act directs SROs like Nasdaq, “in general, 
to protect investors and the public interest.”183 The Act is silent on prioritizing 
prospective investors over existing investors. It does, however, direct SROs to 
“promote just and equitable principles of trade” and “to remove impediments to 
and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market.”184 Arbitrarily selecting 
one class of investors to protect over others is hardly aligned with those edicts. 
It is not just or equitable to distribute losses to traders who would profit greatly 
in the absence of regulatory action in order to protect hypothetical future 
investors, and halting trade on a stock and its options for a month and a half 
absent a compelling reason is the exact opposite of removing impediments to a 
free and open market. Nasdaq might contend that by blocking an allegedly 
fraudulent company from trading on its exchange, it comports with the Act’s 
directive to “prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices.”185 While 
perhaps true in an extremely narrow sense, this fails to acknowledge that Nasdaq 
had already allowed Longfin to trade freely for months; the cat was very much 
 
 181. Reference Library—Advanced Search, NASDAQ, https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/ViewPDF.aspx? 
Material_Search.aspx?mcd=LQ&cid=120,1,108,14,22,29,107,34,37,38,45,16,110,52,71,69&years=2016,2015,
2014,2016,2015,2014,2013,2012,2011,2010,2009,2008,2007,2006,2005,2004,2003,2002&sub_cid=&searchke
ywords=halt&exactsearchddvalue=1&Print=N&materials=0&popularfl= (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
 182. Riot Blockchain, Inc. Common Stock (RIOT), NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/riot (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
 183. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5). 
 184. Id.  
 185. See id.  
714 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:687 
already out of the bag, and the halt did not “prevent” any further alleged fraud – 
Nasdaq had its chance at prophylaxis in deciding whether to list Longfin and 
failed. 
Short sellers, particularly in the wake of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, 
are oft-vilified, and their role in the market widely misunderstood.186 The then-
President of the New York Stock Exchange, Tom Farley, stated in 2017 that the 
practice “feels kind of icky and un-American.”187 Embattled Tesla CEO and pop 
culture figure Elon Musk has publicly obsessed over those shorting his company, 
and while he stopped short of accusing these particular enemies of pederasty,188 
derided them as “value destroyers” and contended that the practice should be 
illegal.189 Short sellers, however, play an important role in maintaining efficient 
markets, by investigating overvalued or even fraudulent public companies.190 
They challenge inflated valuations, and because their profits depend on it, they 
have an intense incentive to discover corporate failures and inefficiencies, 
whereas analysts and stockholders might be content with relatively cursory due 
diligence.191 Thus, short sellers serve as a defense against asset bubbles and 
frauds.192 Which is not to say, of course, that individual short sellers investigate 
out of the goodness of their hearts; like all other private market actors, they are 
fundamentally self-interested, and thus susceptible to engaging in fraudulent or 
otherwise condemnable practices. Short sellers’ legitimate interests, however, 
deserve as much protection as any other market actor’s, because they are equally 
as important for price discovery and the maintenance of a healthy market. Cases 
like Longfin and TFS Capital demonstrate a deficiency in these protections,193 
in turn depleting the incentive for short sellers to continue their investigation of 
frauds that regulators fail to catch. If a prospective short seller must fear that 
regulatory action might deprive them of their benefit, or worse—place them in 
an intractable position that generates huge losses—they are less likely to bother 
investigating in the first place, leaving the market overall more vulnerable to the 
proliferation of fraud and overvaluation. Some view short sellers as the scum-
sucking bottom feeders of the market—and perhaps there is some validity to that 
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comparison—but bottom feeders, ugly as they may be, are a vital part of any 
ecosystem.194 
B.  LITIGATION PROVIDES LITTLE RECOURSE 
Traders affected by the halt were unsurprisingly eager to sue, with the most 
obvious and popular target being Nasdaq itself.195 As already discussed,196 any 
cause of action brought against Nasdaq faces insurmountable hurdles. Given that 
“there are few functions more quintessentially regulatory than suspension of 
trading,”197 there is really no question that Nasdaq is entitled to quasi-
governmental absolute immunity against actions brought by harmed Longfin 
shorts. As for suing Longfin and its affiliates, even if an action against them is 
sustainable, the prospects of recovering tens of millions from foreign-based 
frauds with essentially no domestic assets are dire. There is a substantial 
likelihood that Longfin and its orchestrators are judgement proof. Additionally, 
even if there are viable causes of action stemming from Nasdaq’s actions, costly 
and protracted litigation is a poor remedy for an issue that is easily preventable.  
This Note will not argue for change in SRO liability. As long as the SRO 
system persists, and there is little reason to think it will not, the reasoning behind 
affording SROs absolute immunity for regulatory actions remains sound— 
regulators in fear of liability are less likely to take any action whatsoever.198 
While the system is ripe for criticism,199 rethinking it entirely is well beyond the 
bounds of this Note, and is simply unnecessary to repair the narrow issue 
presented in the case of Longfin. 
IV.  RETHINKING REGULATORY HALTS 
A.  TRANSPARENCY 
Putting aside changes that would have prevented the unnecessary losses 
stemming from the halt, the first problematic throughline to address is the 
remarkable lack of transparency displayed by Nasdaq throughout the story. 
Besides the T12 code used to describe the type of halt being implemented, 
Nasdaq’s only other mass communication with concerned traders consisted of a 
press release issued concurrently with the halt stating that “[t]rading will remain 
halted until Longfin Corp. has fully satisfied Nasdaq’s request for additional 
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information.”200 Traders who called in directly reported that Nasdaq refused to 
comment on Longfin specifically and gave only generalized answers about 
trading halts and the delisting process.201 Nasdaq never explained what 
information they were purportedly seeking, or how its request could be “fully 
satisfied” so as to trigger resumption of trading. Not only was this paucity of 
information unhelpful, it was actively misleading—the press release suggested 
that Longfin might resume trading when really, Nasdaq likely never intended to 
lift the halt regardless of what information Longfin provided. This last point is 
and will remain speculative—Nasdaq has not disclosed any further explanation 
for their decision to keep the halt in place; nor do they have a history of doing 
so. 
Greater transparency from Nasdaq and similarly situated SROs would be 
almost purely beneficial to the integrity of the market as a whole. Transparency 
will not only allow market participants to be better informed in their decision-
making, it will inspire greater confidence in the market overall, particularly from 
the perspective of retail traders who lack the insider lines of communication 
possessed by large financial institutions. Nasdaq might argue that issuers are 
entitled to confidentiality in the proceedings surrounding a halt, but this fails to 
convince. From a purely legalistic perspective, there is simply no justification 
for this attitude in plain language of the relevant statutes. Further, it would be 
plainly contrary to the pro-disclosure principles that are the foundation of 
modern securities regulation. Affording confidentiality to issuers who are non-
compliant with that regime in the first instance cuts directly against those 
principles of transparency. Additionally, the argument fails to justify Nasdaq’s 
lack of transparency after the fact. Even accepting arguendo that in-the-moment 
confidentiality is appropriate, Nasdaq’s near-total silence as to its internal 
proceedings regarding Longfin even after the stock was delisted is totally 
inconsistent with the aims of the securities laws.  
This Note will not propose specific formulations for a new transparency 
regime; assuming they can be trusted to act in the public interest, the SROs 
themselves, being familiar with aspects of their regulatory operations that 
currently take place behind closed doors, are best situated to address the problem 
in conjunction with SEC oversight. Further, the aim of this Note is not to propose 
a solution to Nasdaq’s reticence; rather, it seeks a change that will prevent 
scenarios such as that presented by the Longfin halt from ever happening again. 
B.  RETHINKING SRO POWER TO HALT 
As demonstrated by the story of Longfin, regulatory halts can have 
devastating effects, making otherwise profitable trades into total losses. In 
discussing the use of regulatory halts by the SEC, the Supreme Court stated that 
“the power to summarily suspend trading in a security even for 10 days, without 
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any notice, opportunity to be heard, or findings based upon a record, is an 
awesome power with a potentially devastating impact on the issuer, its 
shareholders, and other investors.”202 With this almost reverential respect for the 
power of regulatory halts in mind, it seems incongruous that exchanges can not 
only emplace their own halts, but can do so indefinitely, with no or minimal 
outside scrutiny, and without any mechanism by which traders and investors can 
overcome them. 
With respect to Longfin, it is this power to halt indefinitely that is 
ultimately responsible for the unjustified losses of short sellers. This is 
fundamentally a problem of timing: options, because of their expiration dates, 
and to a lesser extent traditional short sales (because of borrow fees), are 
extremely time-sensitive.203 Nasdaq, by halting Longfin for forty-seven straight 
days, locked a huge amount of traders into these time-sensitive positions with 
no meaningful opportunity to close them, much less profit from them. Fixing 
this problem does not require completely stripping the power of exchanges to 
issue regulatory halts, nor is such a change justified. There are perfectly 
legitimate reasons for an exchange to issue a trading halt; namely, to gather and 
disseminate developing information so that market participants can make 
informed trading decisions—exactly what Nasdaq purported to, but did not do 
here. By using its T12 halt code, Nasdaq’s official position was that it was 
seeking additional information from Longfin, yet it never disclosed any 
information that was not already publicly available. Instead, it appears that 
Nasdaq, embarrassed at having allowed such an obvious fraud to list, simply 
wanted the company to stop trading on its exchange as quickly as possible and 
used a regulatory halt to accomplish that end. Admittedly, this is conjecture, but 
even without imputing this untoward motive to Nasdaq, the action itself is 
simply contrary to the general notion of “free and open markets.”204 
To fix this problem, the 1934 Act should be amended to place a limit on 
the number of consecutive days exchanges like Nasdaq can maintain a 
regulatory halt. This change is consistent with limits on SEC regulatory halts, 
which can only last up to ten business days without notice and opportunity for 
hearing.205 There are no compelling reasons to avoid applying similar restraint 
to self-regulating exchanges. Perhaps the technological limitations that existed 
in 1934 justified giving the exchanges this unfettered power—gathering and 
disseminating information in that time period was prodigiously difficult and 
time consuming when compared to the ease of information transfer today. The 
advent of the internet, however, made such endeavors trivial, and that reasoning 
largely uncompelling. Further, placing a limit on halt duration will encourage 
the exchanges to be swift in their enforcement efforts, and more diligent in 
regulating what they let list in the first place. 
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A five business day limit on exchange-issued regulatory halts, akin to the 
limit that already exists on SEC halts, would have prevented the unjustified 
losses of Longfin short sellers. The potential for harm inflicted by indefinite 
halts vastly outweighs whatever meager benefits they provide, and such a change 
is in line with the duty levied on SROs—to encourage the development of a free 
and open market.206 
CONCLUSION 
Beneath the humorous veneer provided by Venkat Meenavalli and his 
antics, Longfin tells a rather sinister story. A story of persistent, repeated failure 
by regulators and large institutions to adequately perform their duties: Nasdaq, 
by allowing Longfin to list in the first place despite apparently being 
demonstrably fraudulent from the jump, by allowing Longfin options to trade 
when they never should have, and by ham-fistedly halting the stock out of 
apparent embarrassment; FTSE Russell, by indexing and in turn legitimizing 
what appeared to be an obvious fraud that clearly did not meet their own 
requirements; and asset managers like BlackRock, who blindly trusted FTSE 
and irresponsibly pumped a stock they had no business buying. All the while, as 
these major players continually fumbled their handling of the company, it fell to 
amateur retail traders to do the regulators’ job. Which they did, and 
commendably so—only to be left holding the bag, cheated out of the benefit of 
their diligence, when Nasdaq arbitrarily decided to halt the stock for forty-seven 
days. While the story of Longfin highlights a host of glaring problems with the 
SRO system, it only provides a clear answer to one: the almost unfettered power 
of self-regulated exchanges to wield the “awesome power” of indefinite trading 
halts. Fortunately, this problem is easily addressed by simply placing a limit on 
the duration of these halts. Short sellers are often the subject of derision in the 
public consciousness, which is unfortunate, because they serve a vitally 
important role in maintaining a healthy market and preventing bubbles. In 
addition to simply being more aligned with the general principle of free and open 
markets, the changes recommended in this Note would protect short sellers’ 
legitimate interests and preserve the incentive for them to do their jobs without 
any meaningful side effects. 
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